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is sought to be enforced. Instead, "where the conduct which is
relied upon for part performance is consistent with the contract
such conduct is sufficient to take the contract out of the statute
of frauds even though such conduct is not inconsistent with
some other dealings arguably had between the parties."'"
JAMES

G.

DE JONG

CRIMINAL LAW
I.

INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Within the space of eight weeks the Wisconsin Supreme
Court gave conflicting interpretations to the meaning of
"involuntarily produced" intoxication as it pertains to Wisconsin Statutes section 939.42. The statute provides:
Intoxication. An intoxicated or a drugged condition of the
actor is a defense only if such condition:
(1) Is involuntarily produced and renders the actor incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in regard to
the alleged criminal act at the time the act is committed; or
(2) Negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to
the crime.
In Staples v. State' the defendant, whose principal defense
was intoxication, was convicted by a jury of kidnapping, burglary and operating a motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred
in restricting the evidence offered by the defendant in an attempt to prove his chronic alcoholism.
The court, relying upon Roberts v.State,2 stated that proof
of alcoholism, when "established by expert medical opinion,"3
could be relevant. "Alcoholism, in itself, is not now and never
has been a separate defense to criminal liability in this
state. .

.

.This court has, however, recognized that proof of

alcoholism may be relevant to the defense of involuntary intox41. 75 Wis. 2d at 670, 250 N.W.2d at 325.
1. 74 Wis. 2d 13, 245 N.W.2d 679 (1976).
2. 41 Wis. 2d 537, 164 N.W.2d 525 (1969).
3. 74 Wis. 2d at 20, 245 N.W.2d at 683.
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ication raised under sec. 939.42(1)."I In particular, "[p]roof of
alcoholism would go to prove involuntariness." 5
In Staples, however, the defense failed to produce any medical experts or "proper medical proof" 6 to establish the fact of
psychological or physiological dependency. Instead, defense
counsel chose to rely solely upon the defendant's own testimony. In addition, the court found that the defendant also
failed to prove the second element of the involuntary intoxication defense, that the defendant was "incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in regard to the alleged criminal
act." 7 For these reasons the trial court was upheld and the
convictions were affirmed.
The impact of Staples was short lived indeed. In Loveday
v. State8 the court explicitly withdrew that portion of the
Staples opinion which held that proof of alcoholism was relevant to the issue of involuntariness.
Loveday concerned a first degree murder conviction. The
trial court had excluded testimony relating to the defendant's
drug addiction. Unlike Staples, expert medical witnesses, in
the form of two psychiatrists, were available to testify. The
question before the court was "whether evidence that defendant was addicted to drugs is relevant to the issue of whether
his drugged condition was involuntarily produced." 9
The court noted that "[t]wo distinct views have emerged
regarding the issue of addiction and involuntariness."° Instead
of following Roberts and Staples," the court in Loveday chose
to adopt "[t]he more generally accepted rule . . . that the
phrase 'involuntary intoxication or drugged condition' does not
contemplate a condition which is the result of an addict's de4. Id. at 19, 245 N.W.2d at 683.
5. Id. at 20, 245 N.W.2d at 684.
6. Id.
7. Wis. STAT. § 939.42(1) (1975).
8. 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W.2d 116 (1976).
9. Id. at 509, 247 N.W.2d at 120.
10. Id., 247 N.W.2d at 121.
11. The court implied that the Staples approach was based on a misunderstanding
of constitutional law. In Robinson v. California, 270 U.S. 660 (1962), the United States
Supreme Court held that a statute which made it a criminal offense to be "addicted
to the use of narcotics" was unconstitutional. As the Wisconsin court noted, however,
Robinson must be read in conjunction with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Powell stated that Robinson "does not deal with the question of whether certain
conduct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense, 'involuntary'
or 'occasioned by a compulsion'." Id. at 533.
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pendency no matter how irresistible the compulsion may be."'"
Loveday announced that involuntary intoxication should refer
only to a condition brought about by "force or fraud on the part
of a third person or the result of mistake by the defendant, such
as where he lacks knowledge of a substance's intoxicating effects."13
In support of the position, the court offered three
"considerations." First, the legislative intent of section
939.42(1) was to provide a defense only to those who became
intoxicated or drugged through no choice of their own. 4
Loveday assumed that nobody becomes addicted to drugs
without first exercising his or her own free will to consume
them. Second, due to the "considerable medical disagreement
regarding the manifestations of addiction, a jury surely could
not decide on any reasonable basis whether an accused was one
of those so addicted that he had lost self-control in taking the
drugs or alcohol."' 5 Third, adequate protections have already
been instituted under the voluntary intoxication defense set
forth in section 939.42(2). An addict who must prove that his
voluntary intoxication negated an essential state of mind,
rather than showing that his involuntary intoxication precluded him from telling right from wrong, is not thereby punished for his disease.
I.

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

Reichhoff v. State" presented a case in which the defendant, who was accused of two murders, took the witness stand
in order to deny his involvement in both offenses. In an attempt
to rebut this testimony, the prosecutor asked two state witnesses a total of five questions relating to the defendant's failure to deny his guilt at the time of his arrest. The trial court
overruled defense counsel's objections and permitted both witnesses to testify that the defendant remained silent during this
12. 74 Wis. 2d at 509, 247 N.W.2d at 121.
13. Id.
14. Sec. 939.42, Stats., was enacted as a part of the 1955 revision of the
Wisconsin Criminal Code, and was first proposed as sec. 339.42 of the 1953 Draft
of the Wisconsin Criminal Code. The comments of the Judiciary Committee
following that section in the 1953 Draft make it clear that the term
"involuntary" only contemplated intoxication through force, fraud or mistake.
Id. at 511-12, 247 N.W.2d at 122.
15. 74 Wis. 2d at 512, 247 N.W.2d at 122.
16. 76 Wis. 2d 375, 251 N.W.2d 470 (1977).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:279

time. In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor twice
attacked the defendant's credibility by commenting on his failure to profess his innocence when originally apprehended. No
curative instructions were given to the jury as the trial court
found both the testimony and comments to be proper.
The supreme court had no difficulty in finding that constitutional errors had been commited by the lower court. 7 On
appeal the state conceded as much but argued that these errors
were subject to the harmless error rule and were not unduly
prejudicial to the defendant. The court, by a margin of four to
two,' 8 disagreed. "Evidence of custodial silence in this case not
only had low probative value but also had a high potential for
great prejudice to a defendant."' 9 The convictions were reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
The court listed the factors it considered in deciding that
prejudicial errors had been committed. The first, and most
important of these factors, was the repetitive nature of the
errors. "This is not a case where the prosecutor casually asked
one witness, on one occasion, whether the defendant professed
innocence at the time of arrest."" The second factor offered by
the court concerned "the nature of the state's evidence." 2 ' It
was deemed significant that the state's case was based entirely
upon circumstantial evidence. Third, the "nature of the defense" 22 was found to be a critical determination. Since Reichhoff had taken the stand to testify, his credibility as a witness
was a primary issue. "The erroneously admitted evidence of
the silence of the defendant - repeatedly put before the jury
- was intended to, and probably did, cast doubt on the defendant's credibility. '"2
17. The questions were manifestly designed to demonstrate a tacit admission of guilt on the part of the defendant. The purpose of the evidence was to
allow the jury to draw an inference of defendant's guilt from the defendant's
silence. Such an inference of guilt is a direct violation of the defendant's right
to remain silent guaranteed by the state constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.
Id. at 378, 251 N.W.2d at 472.
18. Joining Justice Abrahamson in the majority opinion were Justices Heffernan,
Robert Hansen and Day. Justices Hanley and Connor Hansen dissented. Chief Justice
Beilfuss took no part in the decision.
19. 76 Wis. 2d at 382, 251 N.W.2d at 474.
20. Id. at 381, 251 N.W.2d at 473.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 381-82, 251 N.W.2d at 474.
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In dissent, Justice Hanley would have had the majority
adhere to the rule enunciated in Woodhull v. State." "This
court has held that errors occurring in the course of a trial will
not serve to overturn a conviction unless it clearly appears that
had they not occurred, the result would probably have been
more favorable to the defendant. ' 25 Justice Hanley felt that the
majority ignored the fact that the state's evidence, although
circumstantial, was overwhelming and "sufficient, without regard to the improper testimony and prosecutorial remarks, to
establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 28
Three months after Reichhoff, the court came to an opposite conclusion in a similar fact situation in Rudolph v. State.2
In Rudolph during the state's case in chief, a police lieutenant
testified that the defendant, while in police custody, "didn't
want to talk. 28 Defense counsel's objection was overruled by
the trial court which responded, "Oh, I think the jury is entitled to the explanation, the defendant is under no obligation
to talk with the officer at all. The defendant was perfectly
within his rights in refusing to talk to the officer." 20 The defense
did not ask that any specific curative instructions be given to
the jury, and none were. The defendant was subsequently
found guilty of burglary and arson.
Rudolph first came before the court in March, 1976 when,
in an unpublished per curiam opinion, it affirmed the convictions." The court, in May of that same year, denied a motion
for rehearing. 3' In January of 1977, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the Wisconsin judgment and remanded the case
3
for "further consideration in light of Doyle v. Ohio."
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted, the ruling in Doyle
v. Ohio33 was restricted to impeachment situations. 4 Since the
24. 43 Wis. 2d 202, 168 N.W.2d 281 (1969).
25. 76 Wis. 2d at 384, 251 N.W.2d at 475.
26. Id. at 383, 251 N.W.2d at 474.
27. 78 Wis. 2d 435, 254 N.W.2d 471 (1977).
28. Id. at 439, 254 N.W.2d at 472.
29. Id., 254 N.W.2d at 473.
30. 71 Wis. 2d 845, 240 N.W.2d 430 (1976).
31. Id.
32. 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
33. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
34. "We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the
time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 619.
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defendant in Rudolph chose not to testify, the Wisconsin court
found that the due process arguments put forth in Doyle were
not applicable. "Rather, this case presents the more fundamental question of whether the prosecution may affirmatively
use in its case in chief the fact that the defendant. . . claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination . . . during custodial
3
'
the court readily concluded
interrogation. '35 Citing Miranda,
that the prosecutor may not.
Finding that error had been committed, the court cited
Reichhoff as being "instructive for the conceptual framework
it provides for harmless error analysis, 3' 7 yet failed thereafter
to follow its schematic approach. 8
By a margin of four to three, the trial court was affirmed
based on the conclusion that the error was harmless. 9 In reaching this conclusion, the court found that Reichhoff was distinguishable on two grounds. First, there was the frequency of
error consideration, the first factor of the Reichhoff test for
harmless error. In Rudolph there had been only one reference
by the prosecutor to the defendant's silence. In Reichhoff there
was a total of seven. Secondly, the court felt that the trial
judge's explanation of the defendant's constitutional rights was
sufficiently curative. Previous cases found that curative instructions which specifically told a jury not to draw any inferences from a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent
were adequate to eliminate any prejudice. This rule was broadened in Rudolph to cover curative "explanations" or
"statements" which fail to include specific warnings. In
Reichhoff there were no curative statements made by the trial
court. However, this factor was never a part of the Reichhoff
test.
35. 78 Wis. 2d at 441, 254 N.W.2d at 474.
36. In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an
individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police
custodial interrogation. The prosecutor may not, therefore, use at trial the fact
that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
37. 78 Wis. 2d at 443, 254 N.W.2d at 474.
38. In contrast, see Justice Day's dissent at 78 Wis. 2d at 447, 254 N.W.2d at 477.
39. The per curiam decision represented the opinions of Chief Justice Beilfuss and
Justices Hanley, Connor Hansen and Robert Hansen. Joining Justice Day in dissent
were Justices Heffernan and Abrahamson.
40. Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972) and State v. Johnson,
60 Wis. 2d 334, 210 N.W.2d 735 (1973).
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The second factor of the Reichhoff test, the nature of the
state's evidence, presumably should have weighed heavily in
favor of the defendant. Like Reichhoff, the evidence relied
upon by the state in Rudolph was purely circumstantial. But,
unlike Reichhoff, the state's case was apparently less than
overwhelming. On appeal, the state filed for permission to confess error concluding that the properly admitted evidence
against the defendant "was barely sufficient to convict."'" In
his dissent Justice Day pointed out that the trial court came
close to granting the defendant's motion for dismissal because
the state's case was so weak.4" The majority, however, came to
a different conclusion and determined that the evidence,
"while circumstantial, was amply sufficient to support the conviction."43
Interestingly enough, the third element of the Reichhoff
test, the nature of the defense, would have provided the majority with another argument for distinguishing these two cases.
As was the situation in Doyle v. Ohio, the erroneously admitted
testimony in Reichhoff was used for impeachment purposes.
The court in Rudolph, however, ignored this element of
Reichhoff completely.
Rudolph's treatment of Reichhoff indicated that the three
part harmless error test of the latter has probably been replaced by a two part test consisting of the frequency of the error
and the balancing effect of any curative statements made by
the trial judge.
The issue in Micale v. State" was whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights
prior to giving an incriminating statement while in police custody.
Micale pointed out that "[tihe burden is on the state to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
informed of his constitutional rights as set forth in Miranda
and that he understood them and intelligently waived them."45
In this case, the defendant upon being advised of his Miranda
rights by a police officer, was asked by the officer if he under41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

78 Wis. 2d at 443, 254 N.W.2d at 475.
Id. at 448 n.1, 254 N.W.2d at 477 n.1.
Id. at 444, 254 N.W.2d at 475.
76 Wis. 2d 370, 251 N.W.2d 458 (1977).
Id. at 371, 251 N.W.2d at 459.
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stood them. The defendant nodded his head, indicating that he
had understood, but said that "he couldn't afford an attorney." 46 The court held that, based on the defendant's response,
he could not knowingly or understandingly have waived his
right against self-incrimination. The police questioning should
have stopped immediately. The defendant's conviction for burglary was reversed since
"the State relied heavily on the defen47
dant's confession.
I.

'

PROSECUTOR'S

DUTY TO DISCLOSE

The issue posed in Ruiz v. State" was whether a prosecutor
has the obligation to disclose to the defense, absent any request, information which is not on its face exculpatory as to
guilt or relevant to punishment.
The state's key witness, who was himself facing other criminal charges in another county, feared that his testimony
against the accused murderer would cost him his life if both he
and the defendant were to be incarcerated together at Waupun.
The district attorney in Ruiz promised the witness that the
other prosecutor would not "push for incarceration,

'49

and that

if he were imprisoned, he would be isolated from Ruiz. The
defendant failed to make any demands for discovery of information in the prosecutor's files and was not made aware of this
arrangement until after the trial. On appeal, the convicted
defendant maintained that withholding this information,
which could have been used for impeachment purposes,
amounted to a denial of due process.
Relying chiefly upon United States v. Agurs,5 ° the court
ruled that "in respect to truly exculpatory evidence, there is a
duty which requires a prosecutor to produce the evidence sua
sponte."I' The evidence in this case, however, "was not exculpatory in any sense of the word. ''52 Although knowledge of the

prosecutor's deal might have damaged the witness' credibility
in the eyes of the jury, nothing in the record suggested that this
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 373, 251 N.W.2d at 459.
Id., 251 N.W.2d at 460.
75 Wis. 2d 230, 249 N.W.2d 277 (1977).
Id. at 232, 249 N.W.2d at 279.
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
75 Wis. 2d at 240, 249 N.W.2d at 283.
Id.
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protective agreement fostered perjured testimony.53 This information, deemed by the court to be irrelevant to the determination of guilt, "was not the type of evidence which the prosecutor, sua sponte, was obliged to disclose." 4 By failing to make
a specific demand for discovery, the defendant waived his right
of disclosure.
IV.

SURPRISE AS GROUNDS FOR A CONTINUANCE
55 concerned the conviction of a father

for
Angus v. State
having incestuous relations with his sixteen year old daughter.
At the preliminary examination the daughter testified that she
had sexual intercourse with her father in the early morning of
August 3, 1974. On cross-examination she admitted that she
was not certain as to the exact date of the offense, but that it
was in the beginning of August. Pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 971.23(8)," the defendant filed a timely notice of
alibi directed toward the late evening hours of August 2 and
early morning hours of August 3. The defendant had also assembled several witnesses who were available to testify in support of this alibi. On the day of the trial the daughter notified
the prosecution of a change in her testimony, that the offense
actually took place on the morning of August 2 instead of August 3. Upon learning this, the defense sought a continuance
from the trial court in order to investigate the evening of Au53. Had there been a withholding of evidence which could have established that

the key witness had given perjured testimony, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972), would have been controlling. A new trial would probably have been required.
54. 75 Wis. 2d at 240, 249 N.W.2d at 283.

55. 76 Wis. 2d 191, 251 N.W.2d 28 (1977).
56. Wis.

STAT.

§ 971.23(8) (1973) provided in pertinent part that:

(a) If the defendant contends to rely upon an alibi as a defense, he shall give
written notice thereof to the district attorney at the arraignment or at least 20
days before trial stating particularly the place where he claims to have been

when the crime is alleged to have been committed together with the names and
addresses of witnesses to the alibi, if known.
(b) In default of such notice, no evidence of the alibi shall be received unless
the court, for cause, orders otherwise.

(c) The court may enlarge the time for filing a notice of alibi as provided in
par. (a) for cause.
(d) Within 10 days after receipt of the notice of alibi, or such other time as

the court orders, the district attorney shall furnish the defendant notice in
writing of the names and addresses, if known, of any witnesses whom the state
proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the defendant's alibi.
Subsection (a) has since been amended to require the defendant to give notice of alibi
to the district attorney at least within 15 days of trial instead of 20. 1975 Wis. Laws,
ch. 378.
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gust 1 by contacting those persons, not available in court that
day, who might be able to testify as to the defendant's whereabouts that night. The trial court denied this request on the
basis that the complainant's new date for the alleged offense
conformed with the date given in the information, but offered
to admit testimony of other alibi witnesses without requiring
the usual notice of alibi. On appeal the issue was whether the
trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's
request for a continuance.
The court stated that under certain circumstances surprise
at trial arising from unexpected testimony is a proper basis for
a continuance. However, continuances are not granted as a
matter of right. Rather, it is up to the discretion of the trial
judge to decide whether or not to grant such a motion. An
abuse of discretion in denying a continuance, according to
Angus, will be found only if three qualifications are met.
First, actual surprise must have existed. The party seeking
the continuance must not have reasonably anticipated the development causing the surprise. 7 Second, where surprise is
caused by unexpected testimony, the party seeking the continuance must have shown that, with a reasonable time, he could
have obtained impeaching evidence.58 Finally, the denial of the
continuance must have been prejudicial to the party seeking
it.59
The majority" in Angus determined that the third element,
actual prejudice to the defendant, was not present in this case.
This conclusion was based on the court's assumption that the
defendant had no alibi. During the two day trial, the defense
made no effort to establish an alibi through the defendant's
own testimony. Two days were sufficient, in the court's opinion, to contact alibi witnesses if any "were available. "Thus, the
record contains absolutely nothing which indicates an alibi for
the evening of August lst-2nd existed, and thus no prejudice
could have resulted by the denial of time to prepare one." 1
Justice Abrahamson, writing in dissent," believed that actual prejudice is presumed whenever the defendant and the
57. 76 Wis. 2d at 196, 251 N.W.2d at 31.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Joining Justice Hanley in the majority were Chief Justice Beilfuss, Justices Leo
Hanley, Connor Hansen and Robert Hansen.
61. 76 Wis. 2d at 198, 251 N.W.2d at 32.
62. Joining Justice Abrahamson in dissent were Justices Heffernan and Day.
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state are surprised by a change in a witness' testimony. According to the dissent, the philosophy behind the Wisconsin alibi
statute and the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
Wardius v. Oregon" dictated the granting of a continuance in
this case:
The only rational and fair interpretation of the alibi statute is that the defendant must advise of alibi, the state must
advise the defendant of its witnesses and the state must give
the defendant timely information as to any change in the
time or place of the offense. If the state fails to give such
timely information to the defendant, the defendant has been
deprived of a fair trial. Without adequate reciprocal discovery opportunity the defendant is denied due process."
V. TRIAL COUNSEL AS BOTH ADVOcATE AND WITNESS
Harris v. State 5 raised the issue of whether the prosecution's calling a defense counsel to the witness stand in order to
impeach a defense witness was prejudicial error.
In this case, two co-defendants were charged with abduction, two counts of sexual perversion and obstructing an officer.
During a chamber conference, one of the defense lawyers asked
the court for permission to have a defense witness attempt an
in-court identification of the victim. The attorney revealed
that he had asked this witness in the hallway outside of the
courtroom if the victim, who was also in the hallway, was someone she had seen on the date of the alleged offense. The witness
said yes. After the witness took the stand, she was crossexamined by the district attorney and was asked if the defense
attorney had pointed the victim out to her in the hallway. The
witness denied this, insisting it was she who pointed out the
victim. The prosecutor then called the defense counsel to the
stand to contradict her testimony.
Citing Ethical Consideration 5-9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility," the Harris court stated that generally this
practice would be unseemly and improper, since "the roles of
witness and advocate are inconsistent." 7 Yet, ultimately,
"[w]hether a lawyer should testify in a trial in which he is an
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

412 U.S. 470 (1973).
76 Wis. 2d at 204, 251 N.W.2d at 35.
78 Wis. 2d 357, 254 N.W.2d 291 (1977).
Id. at 369, 254 N.W.2d at 297.
Id. at 368-69, 254 N.W.2d at 297.
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advocate is a matter for the trial court's discretion."" s
Harrisconcluded that although calling the defense attorney
was improper, it was not prejudicial. It did not prevent the
defendant from obtaining a fair trial. "The testimony was brief
and collateral; it tended to corroborate and not to impeach the
. .' 69
defense witness.
VI.

INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
7" the court

resolved an
In State ex rel. Winnie v. Harris,
apparent conflict between Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with an indigent's right to counsel. In Winnie the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief after
being convicted of a misdemeanor 7 ' and sentenced to ninety
days in jail. 72 It was undisputed that the petitioner was neither
advised of his right to counsel nor told that counsel would be
appointed if he was indigent. It was also undisputed that the
73
petitioner did not waive his right to counsel.
Under a prior decision, State ex rel. Plutshack v. Department of Health & Social Services,"7 appointment of counsel was
required only when an indigent was charged with a crime carrying a maximum jail term of more than six months. However,
in Argersinger v. Hamlin75 the Supreme Court held that no
person could be imprisoned for any length of time unless he was
represented by counsel at trial. Overruling that portion of
Plutshack dealing with the six month limitation, the court held
that the rule in Argersinger was controlling."
However, the court noted the inherent problems with the
68. 78 Wis. 2d at 369, 254 N.W.2d at 298.
69. Id.
70. 75 Wis. 2d 547, 249 N.W.2d 791 (1977).
71. Wis. STAT. § 936.60 (1975) defines felony and misdemeanor: "A crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison is a felony. Every other crime is a misdemeanor."
72. Petitioner was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license had been
revoked (second offense) in violation of Wis. STAT. § 343.44(1) (1975). He was sentenced under (2) of the same section which provides: "Any person violating this section
• . .shall be imprisoned not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county
jail for the 2nd such violation. .. ."
73. 75 Wis. 2d at 551, 249 N.W.2d at 793.
74. 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N.W.2d 549, reh. denied, 157 N.W.2d 567 (1968).
75. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Argersinger is clearly directed at right to counsel in misdemeanor and municipal ordinance prosecutions. Right to counsel in felony cases is
mandated by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
76. 75 Wis. 2d at 552-53, 249 N.W.2d at 794.
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77 Requiring the trial
retrospective test advanced in Argersinger.
judge to determine in advance if he might sentence the defendant to prison would interfere with the legislative intent that
imprisonment be an alternative; the judge would be called
upon to make a prediction without the benefit of facts and
inferences derived from the record at trial. Therefore, under the
"individualized prediction" standard the judge might have to
contemplate sentencing the defendant to prison before introduction of evidence. Lastly, by making the prior determination
not to appoint counsel, there is the possibility that some defendants would not be incarcerated despite the evidence later indicating the need for it.
Opting for a prospective application of the right to counsel,
the court retained that aspect of Plutshack and required that
all defendants be informed of the right to counsel if there is any
possibility of their imprisonment.78 Therefore, the court necessarily adopted the rule in Argersingerthat the right to counsel
exists if the defendant is in fact sentenced to jail. The court
also adopted the reasoning of Argersinger, in that nonindigent
persons must also be informed of their right to counsel even if
they have to pay for it. The Winnie decision mandates that
whenever a person is charged with a crime for which he can or
must be imprisoned for any length of time, he must be advised
of his right to counsel. Furthermore, if the defendant is indigent, he must be advised that, absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, counsel will be provided for him at public expense.

VII.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A. Invalid Search Warrant
In Schmidt v. State79 the court upheld the validity of a
search conducted in execution of an invalid search warrant on
the grounds that it was conducted within a reasonable time
following an arrest based on probable cause. An unnamed informant called an undercover police agent with a tip that the
77. Argersinger requires that an accused be advised of the right to counsel and that
counsel be appointed for an indigent (unless waived) only when a jail term is actually
given. For criticism of the test, see S. KRAN'r2, C. SMrrH, D. RossmAN, P. FRoYD, J.
HOFFMAN,

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE

OF ARGERSINGER V.

HAMLIN (1976). For a practical explanation of the test's consequences, see Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion in Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 42.
78. 75 Wis. 2d at 556, 249 N.W.2d at 796.
79. 77 Wis. 2d 370, 253 N.W.2d 204 (1977).
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defendant had brought drugs into the city and was about to do
so again. The informant claimed that he had purchased "speed
pills" from the defendant, and a field test by the police office
confirmed that they were amphetamines. After being told that
the defendant was expected to return in his car to the vicinity
the next day with a large quantity of "speed," the police officer
consulted with the district attorney who advised him that if the
defendant returned on the particular day there would be probable cause to make an arrest. After a stakeout, the defendant's
car was intercepted and the defendant arrested. The car was
secured but not searched on that same Friday. Following the
weekend, a search warrant was issued based on the affidavit of
the police officer.
The affidavit stated that the unnamed informant had provided reliable information in the past, had previously purchased drugs for the police officer, and had told the police
officer that the defendant was a main distributor of "speed" in
the area. All the material elements of the affidavit were later
admitted to be false, and the search warrant was declared invalid. 8 The court upheld the search on the grounds that it was
conducted within a reasonable time following an arrest based
on probable cause.
A difficult portion of Schmidt concerns the court's justification of the validity of the arrest based on probable cause.
Applying the two prong test of Aguilar v. Texas,s1 the court
concluded the information was reliable because the officer had
been told that the informant had overheard a conversation of
the defendant and because the informant had procured
"speed" pills from the defendant which the officer had field
tested. The court concluded that the informant was reliable
because he took actions against his own penal interest in giving
the pills to the police officer, and that the personal stake of the
informant as to the truth of his representations was sufficient
to show reliability. 2 The court ignored the fact that the officer
80. Id. at 377, 253 N.W.2d at 207-08.
81. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Aguilar, the court held that if probable cause is to be
based solely on an informant's information, then two things must be shown: (1) that
the underlying circumstances are sufficient for the officer to conclude that the manner
in which the informant obtained his information is reliable; and (2) that the underlying
circumstances make it reasonable for the officer to conclude that the informant himself
is reliable. Id. at 114.
82. Although not cited by the court, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971),
specifically held that "[a]dmissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary
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had admitted that the informant had not provided reliable
information in the past. 3 Apparently the court was willing to
uphold the second prong of the test solely upon a single act
against penal interest rather than upon the whole of the information available. The court held the search warrant invalid
because the police officer lied in his affidavit and because the
underlying facts had been misrepresented. However, the court
found that the same officer's testimony at trial created a reasonable inference, based upon his experiences with the informant, that both the information and the informant were reliable.
Thus, the court concluded there was adequate basis for a valid
warrantless arrest and a subsequent search incident to that
arrest. 4
The court cited State v. Phelps" in support of the rule that
a search is not automatically invalid despite the defective warrant if the search is conducted within a reasonable time following an arrest based on probable cause. In Phelps the police
arrested the defendant and waited three hours while a search
warrant was obtained before conducting the search. Subsequently, the search warrant was held to be invalid but the court
upheld the search saying that it was conducted within a reasonable time following a valid arrest. 6 In Schmidt the court extended the reasonable time to three days. This holding all but
ignores Day v. State 7 wherein the court stated that a search
can be considered incident to an arrest only if it bears a relainterests, carry their own indicia of credibility - sufficient at least to support a finding
of probable cause to search." Id. at 583.
83. 77 Wis. 2d at 377, 253 N.W.2d at 207.
84. Regarding the reliability of an informant, and the quantum of evidence needed
to support a finding of probable cause, see generally, State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci, 45
Wis. 2d 432, 173 N.W.2d 175 (1970). See also Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 207
N.W.2d 589 (1973). However, the manner in which probable cause is alleged may vary,
depending upon the stage to which the matter has proceeded. See State v. Williams,
47 Wis. 2d 242, 177 N.W.2d 611 (1970).
85. 73 Wis. 2d 313, 243 N.W.2d 213 (1976).
86. In Phelps, an illegal search of defendant's suitcases was conducted prior to his
arrest. Upon claiming his baggage, the defendant was arrested; the police then applied
for a search warrant to search the suitcases. The court excluded evidence obtained in
the first search of the baggage when considering whether there was probable cause to
arrest the defendant. After considering other evidence the court concluded that there
were sufficient facts on which to uphold the arrest. The court then held that although
the search warrant was invalid due to the prior illegal search, the subsequent search
after arrest was legal because the three hour wait (while the warrant was being issued)
was reasonable.
87. 61 Wis. 2d 236, 212 N.W.2d 489, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 914 (1973).
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tionship of contemporaneity to the arrest and is confined to the

vicinity of the arrest. In Day the seizure of household goods
(which were eventually determined to have been stolen) took
place several hours after the arrest and several miles from the
presence of the defendant, who at the time of the search was
incarcerated. Under those circumstances the search of a vehicle
was found not be incident to an arrest.
Lastly, in upholding the search the court failed to mention
any of the cases dealing with searches of a motor vehicle."8 It
5 could have been menappears that Carroll v. United States"
tioned in justifying the delayed search. Alternatively, because
the defendant's car was impounded, an inventory search conducted pursuant to routine police procedures would have been
permissible and would have provided a firmer basis for upholding the search."
The court's conclusory discussion of the information which
created probable cause for the warrantless arrest, and the summary fashion in which it upheld the search, are disturbing.
Another unsettling portion of the Schmidt decision is its extension of the reasonable time in which to conduct a search incident to an arrest. The court did not indicate that the application of this rule was limited by the facts of this case. The court
merely stated that "[tihe weekend delay in this case is reasonable." Schmidt therefore does not provide any clear standard
of what will be considered a reasonable time between an arrest
and a search incident thereto. Unfortunately, the resolution of
issues concerning this "reasonable time" in future cases must
remain unpredictable.
B. The Plain View Doctrine
In State v. Monahan2 the court discussed the "plain view"
88. Although the line of reasoning put forth in these cases can be avoided by
asserting that the search in the instant case was made incident to an arrest, the
peculiarities of the facts in Schmidt would seem to warrant application of these cases.
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
89. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll the court upheld a warrantless search of an
automobile upon probable cause. The decision was premised upon mobility of the car,
the fact that the occupants were alerted, and the possibility that the contents of the
car might not have been found if there was a delay caused by requiring a warrant.
90. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See also State v. Stevens,
26 Wis. 2d 451, 132 N.W.2d 502 (1965).
91. 77 Wis. 2d at 378, 253 N.W.2d at 208.
92. 76 Wis. 2d 387, 251 N.W.2d 421 (1977).
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exception to the fourth amendment search warrant requirement. In Monahan two federal narcotics agents learned from
an informant that marijuana sticks could be purchased
through an intermediary from the defendant, who was waiting
at the intermediary's farm house but did not want to meet with
anyone. Arrangements were made to purchase some marijuana,
and the agents, informant, and intermediary traveled to the
farmhouse. The agents were invited into the house, passed
through part of the kitchen and were directed to the den. They
were told not to go into the living room. The intermediary then
went through the kitchen into the living room where the defendant, Monahan, was sitting. One of the agents followed the
intermediary into the kitchen and observed that the intermediary removed a bag of marijuana from beneath a couch near the
defendant. After the purchase was made in the den, both the
intermediary and Monahan were arrested. Monahan moved to
suppress the evidence on grounds that it was obtained by an
illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion
and Monahan pleaded guilty to a charge of possession. On
appeal, the court faced the issues of whether the visual surveillance of the living room (which disclosed the marijuana to the
agents and allowed them to identify the defendant next to the
contraband) was a search, and if so, whether it violated the
protection of the fourth amendment.
Initially, the court distinguished between an invitation extended to a family member or close friend and an invitation
made to a salesman to enter a particular room or area of the
house. The relationship of the parties and the circumstances of
the visit usually determine the extent of the invitation. If the
agent had the right to be in the kitchen, then anything he saw
would properly be admissible. 3 The court stated that the conduct of the intermediary and the agents demonstrated that the
agents were to remain in the den; therefore, when the agent
followed the intermediary into the kitchen he was on an
"exploratory investigation." By looking into the living room he
93. See Molina v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 662, 668-69, 193 N.W.2d 874, 877, cert. denied,
407 U.S. 923 (1972). In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), the court stated
that "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." See also
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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was "prying into hidden places for that which was concealed." 94
The majority of the court concluded that a search had occurred.
The court indicated that the dwelling place is to be afforded
the highest protection against intrusion,9" but that an exception to the warrant requirement could be made if the contraband was in plain view. The court noted the inherent limitations on the plain view doctrine97 and held that, regarding what
the agent saw, the evidence should have been suppressed because the agent lacked the authority to be in the kitchen and
the view of the contraband being taken from beneath the couch
was not inadvertent. 8 Concluding that only the fruits of the
illegal search (i.e., the identification of Monahan near the marijuana as it was removed) should have been suppressed, the
court noted that because the marijuana had been voluntarily
delivered to the agents, it had not been seized as a product of
the illegal search. Therefore, the marijuana itself, as well as
testimony that the agents saw the defendant in the house as
they entered, were found to be properly admissible. Monahan
upholds a high degree of protection against intrusion into the
home by focusing upon the extent of an invitation into the
home and its effect upon the reasonableness of a search made
possible by the invitation.
VIII.

DRIvER's LICENSE REVOCATION

In State v. Collova,99 the defendant was required to file and
maintain proof of financial responsibility because of a previous
revocation of his driver's license. Collova had complied with
the requirement by filing a certificate of insurance with the
Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles.
94. 76 Wis. 2d at 395, 251 N.W.2d at 423.
95. Id., 251 N.W.2d at 424. See State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 201 N.W.2d
153, 157 (1972). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
96. See note 91 supra.
97. The limitations placed on the plain view doctrine were enunciated at length in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Generally, there must be prior
justification based on either a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident
to a lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with
a search directed against the accused. Furthermore, the discovery of the evidence must
be inadvertent. Lastly, the object must be of an incriminating nature.
98. 76 Wis. 2d at 396-97, 251 N.W.2d at 424-25. Compare State v. Spraggin, 71 Wis.
2d 604, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1976) (consensual search) with State v. O'Brien 70 Wis. 2d
414, 234 N.W.2d 362 (1975) (search incident to a lawful arrest).
99. 79 Wis. 2d 473, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977).
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Ten days prior to the expiration of the defendant's insurance
the department mailed a notice to Collova that his operating
privilege would be revoked unless he filed new financial proof.
Collova never received the notice and was subsequently
stopped and charged with operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his operating license. The defendant pleaded not
guilty and moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the
statute under which he was charged"' was constitutionally
defective. The motion to dismiss was granted by the county
court and affirmed by the circuit court, but the supreme court
reversed.
The court noted that the statute had been changed to eliminate the need for giving notice by certified mail and merely
required first class mailing. Collova's attempted defense of
nonreceipt of the notice was held invalid because the statute
clearly denied the availability of such a defense. 10 1
The court then considered whether mens rea or scienter was
material to the existence of an offense under the statute. The
absence of express words requiring or negativing any state of
mind is not determinative because criminal statutes are often
silent on this matter.102 Therefore, the judicial branch must
ascertain the legislative intent from the nature of the statute. 3
However, the court did state that the element of scienter was
the rule rather than the exception in criminal jurisprudence.' 4
Relying on Morissette v. United States,01 the court stated that
100. Wis. STAT. § 343.44 (1973) provides in part:
(1) No person whose operating privilege has been duly revoked or suspended
pursuant to the laws of this state shall operate a motor vehicle upon any highway in this state during such suspension or revocation or thereafter before filing
proof of financial responsibility or before he has obtained a new license in this
state or his operating privilege has been reinstated under the laws of this
state. ..
(2) Any person violating this section may be fined not less than $100 nor more
than $400 and shall be imprisoned not less than 10 days nor more than one year
in the county jail. . . . Refusal to accept or failure to receive an order of revocation or suspension mailed by 1st class mail to such person's last-known address
shall not be a defense to the charge of driving after revocation or suspension. If
such person has changed his address and fails to notify the division as required
in s. 343.22 then failure to receive notice of revocation or suspension shall not
be a defense to the charge of driving after revocation or suspension.
101. 79 Wis. 2d at 479, 255 N.W.2d at 584.
102. Id.
103. See Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
104. State v. Alfonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 476, 147 N.W.2d 550, 555 (1960).
105. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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regulatory statutes are primarily concerned with the protection
of social and public interests and the prevention of direct and
widespread social injury.'"6 As such, the public interest warrants the imposition of an absolute standard of care so that the
defendant can have no excuse for violating the law.
The court cited several facts which suggested that scienter
should be disregarded, including the fact that the regulation
was a motor vehicle law designed to benefit the social order,
that the control of the state over those who are licensed to drive
seems to correlate positively to a reduced rate of injury on the
highway, and that the public would be seriously harmed by
unlicensed drivers. However, the court held that despite these
indicators, scienter was necessary to prove this offense because
of the severe consequences attached to a violation of the stat07
ute.1
With the addition of scienter as an element of an offense
under Wisconsin Statutes section 343.44, the state must prove
that: (1) the defendant's license was revoked or suspended according to state law, (2) the Division of Motor Vehicles sent
notice of revocation or suspension by first class mail to the
defendant's last known address, (3) the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on a state highway during such revocation
or suspension, and (4) the defendant had cause to believe that
his license might have been revoked or suspended.' The court
specified that a defendant has cause to believe that his license
might be revoked or suspended when he has actual knowledge,
when he receives notification, or when (under a reasonable man
standard) he knows or should know of the existence of facts or
circumstances which might cause the revocation or suspension.
Because failure to prove financial responsibility could result in
revocation or suspension of the license, the court noted that the
state could prove scienter by showing that the defendant knew
or had reason to know that his insurance had been terminated.
Thus, the necessary scienter would be established if the defendant had been told by his insurer that his insurance had been
106. Common regulatory statutes deal with the sale of food and drugs, sale of
intoxicating liquors to minors, traffic law violations, and sale of misbranded articles.
See Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). See generally LAFAvE & Scorr,
CmMiNAL LAW, § 31, at 218 (1972); Harring, Liability Without Fault:Logic & Potential
of a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 1201.
107. See Wis. STAT. § 343.44(2) (1973) cited note 100 supra.
108. 79 Wis. 2d at 488, 255 N.W.2d at 588.
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terminated, or if he had violated a policy provision or had
failed to pay premiums, either of which would cause termina0
tion. 9
IX. SENTENCING
The area of sentencing has caused the court no small
amount of difficulty. The court has found the statutes specifying the sentences either overly constrictive or exceedingly loose
and has continually requested the legislature to clarify its
poorly drafted statutes. The statute calling for the maximum
permissible punishment, life imprisonment, was found to allow
a stay of execution and placement on probation instead of imprisonment," 0 while a statute dealing with the motor vehicle
code was found to provide for no discretionary judicial relief.,'
The defendant in State v. Wilson"2 was convicted of firstdegree murder, contrary to Wisconsin Statutes section
940.01(1),"3 in the shooting death of her husband. As required
by the statute, the sentence of life prisonment was imposed.",
However, execution of the sentence was stayed and the defendant was placed on probation for fifteen years. On appeal, the
court affirmed the trial court's reading of the first-degree murder statute; the statute did not state that the crime "shall be
punished by imprisonment" nor did it prohibit probation."'
The court undertook a historical review of the legislative methods of designating which crimes would or would not be subject
to probation. The court concluded that there were two basic
means by which the legislature could accomplish this: (1) by
setting forth the punishment for the crime to the exclusion of
probation, or (2) by excepting the possibility of probation for
certain crimes from the probation statute itself."' Since the
legislature had done neither, the probation statute was found
to apply.
109. Id.
110. State v. Wilson, 77 Wis. 2d 15, 252 N.W.2d 64 (1977).
111. State v. Sittig, 75 Wis. 2d 497, 249 N.W.2d 770 (1977).
112. 77 Wis. 2d 15, 252 N.W.2d 64 (1977).
113. Wis. STAT. § 940.01(1) (1975) provides: "First-degree murder. (1) Whoever
causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another shall
be sentenced to life imprisonment."
114. Id.
115. Wis. STAT. § 973.09 (1975) does not except § 940.01 from its provisions regarding discretionary probation.
116. 77 Wis. 2d at 18, 252 N.W.2d at 65-66.
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Ordinarily a probation statute empowers a court to either
withhold the sentence, or impose the sentence and stay its
execution.11 7 However, the legislature foreclosed the first option
in first degree murder cases by imposing a mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment. Nonetheless, the supreme court held that
the second option remained open to the trial court. The court
recognized that it is a legislative function to prescribe penalties, and, in light of the policy implications involved, directed
the legislature's attention to the statute.
State v. Sittig"5 presented the court with the problem of the
mandatory sentence requirement under Wisconsin Statutes
section 343.44. 119The defendant was found guilty on two counts
of operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his license.
Pursuant to the mandatory sentence provision, he was sentenced to one year in the county jail upon each count, with the
sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the mandatory sentencing provision was unconstitutional because it violated the doctrine of separation of powers
and constituted a denial of equal protection. 2 ' The defendant
argued that the legislature had usurped the judicial power of
imposing sentences. In refusing to recognize any inherent
power of the judiciary to absolutely determine the nature of the
punishment, the court held that it was within the province of
the legislature to determine what punishment is to be related
to a particular crime.' The court stated that it would be an
117. Prue v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 109, 112, 216 N.W.2d 43, 44 (1974).
118.. 75 Wis. 2d 497, 249 N.W.2d 770 (1977).
119. Wis. STAT. § 343.44(2) (1975) provides:
(2) Any person violating this section may be fined not less than $100 nor more
than $400 and shall be imprisoned not less than 10 days nor more than one year
in the county jail, except that if a person violates this section after having had
his operating privilege revoked because of a conviction of any of the offenses
mentioned in s. 343.31, he shall be imprisoned not less than 10 days nor more
than one year in the county jail for the first violation of this section and shall
be imprisoned not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail
for the 2nd such violation and shall be imprisoned for one year in the county
jail for the 3rd and each subsequent violation. ...
In State v. Duffy, 54 Wis. 2d 61, 194 N.W.2d 624 (1972), the court held that this
provision mandated a jail sentence and no probation could be allowed. The mandatory
nature of this provision was dispositive of the case in State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473,
255 N.W.2d 581 (1977), where the court held that scienter is necessary to prove a
violation of this statute.
120. 75 Wis. 2d at 499, 249 N.W.2d at 771.
121. Id. at 499, 249 N.W.2d at 772. See also State v. City of Monona, 63 Wis. 2d
67, 72, 216 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1974); State v. Duffy, 54 Wis. 2d 61, 66-67, 194 N.W.2d
624, 627 (1972).

1977]

TERM OF THE COURT

abuse of discretion and a usurpation of the legislative field to
refuse to impose a mandatory sentence prescribed by the legislature. It is not unconstitutional for the legislature to restrict
the exercise of discretion by the courts. 22'
In response to the equal protection argument, the court held
there were sufficient public policy reasons to distinguish between persons who operated vehicles after revocation and those
sentenced for other misdemeanor violations.'2 The court recognized that since the statute's purpose was to decrease auto
accidents and injuries by imposing a fair penalty upon those
who have shown they are most likely to cause the accidents, the
mandatory sentencing provision in the statute did not deny the
defendant equal protection. 24'
The separation of powers argument advanced by the defendant represents an old school of thinking which has generally
been unsuccessful in attacking mandatory sentencing provisions. 2 ' However, a possible argument against the "fair penalty" of the statute can be made based on the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. This attack
would be grounded on the assertion that the statute prescribes
a sentence which is excessive, disproportionate, and lacking
necessity.1 21 Such an approach has been used successfully in
attacking other statutes.'2 Given the nature of the offense,
possible length of sentence, and the fact that the court has
already recognized that the penalty is severe,' 21 such an attack
on the one year sentence might prove successful.
In Klimas v. State'29 the court mandated credit against a
jail term for presentence confinement occasioned by indigency
where less than the maximum sentence was imposed. Previously the court had declared that when the sentence imposed
is the statutory maximum, and because of financial inability
122. 75 Wis. 2d at 500, 249 N.W.2d at 772.
123. Id. at 500-01, 249 N.W.2d at 772, citing, State v. Duffy, 54 Wis. 2d 61, 194
N.W.2d 624 (1972).
124. 75 Wis. 2d at 501, 249 N.W.2d at 772.
125. See Ex ParteUnited States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). See also Steuart & Bro., Inc.
v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944); Comment, The Constitutionalityof MandatorySentence Statutes, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 164 (1972).
126. See Annot., 33 L. Ed. 2d 932 (1954).
127. In re Rodriguez, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384 (1975); see 44 FoRDHAM L.
Rv. 637 (1975); see also People v. Wingo, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 534 P.2d 1001 (1975).
128. State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 485, 255 N.W.2d 581, 587 (1977).
129. 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977).
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to post bail, the defendant had been held in custody, the time
spent in custody prior to conviction must be credited against
the sentence. However, where the sentence was less than the
statutory maximum, the trial court merely had to take into
consideration whatever time the defendant had spent in preconviction custody when determining the length of the sentence to be imposed.' 3 The previous law was based on (1) equal
protection considerations of those who were financially unable
to post bail, and (2) the fact that failure to credit pretrial or
presentence time to those in custody because of indigency
would mean that indigents must serve longer sentences than
3
defendants who were better off fiiancially.' 1
The Klimas court stated that this credit to indigent convicts was mandated by the constitution, and could not be denied by Wisconsin Statutes section 973.15(1),2 which provides
that a sentence shall commence only upon the defendant's
entry into prison. The court extended the logic of the previous
law and held that pretrial or presentence time should be credited against any sentence imposed by the trial court. 33 However, the court noted its limited power to extend the pretrial
or presentence credit, and stated that this rule would not apply
to all defendants, but would only apply to those who were
found to be indigent. The court specifically requested the legislature adopt the federal procedure in which all presentence
confinement is administratively (not judicially) credited toward satisfaction of the sentence.'3 4 The administrative proce130. Byrd v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 415, 222 N.W.2d 696 (1974).
131. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970);
Douglas v. California, 273 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
132. Wis. STAT. § 973.15(1) (1975) provides:
All sentences to the Wisconsin state prisons shall be for one year or more.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, all sentences commence at noon
on the day of sentence, but time which elapses after sentence while the defendant is in the county jail or is at large on bail shall not be computed as any part
of the term of imprisonment. The court may impose as many sentences as there
are convictions and may provide that any such sentence be concurrent or that
it shall commence at the expiration of any other sentence; and if the defendant
is then serving a sentence, the present sentence may provide that it shall commence at the expiration of the previous sentence. If a convict escapes, the time
during which he is unlawfully absent from the prison after such escape shall not
be computed as part of his term. Courts may impose sentences to be served in
whole or in part concurrently with a sentence being served in a federal institution or an institution of another state.
133. 75 Wis. 2d at 248-50, 249 N.W.2d at 287-88.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
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dure has two distinct advantages - conservation of court time
and a simple yet just methodology - because it treats all presentence confinement the same way, whether it results from
inability to make bail, unwillingness to be released on bail, or
retention in custody for the purposes of examination.
In Wisconsin, however, the trial judge must now ascertain
the number of days the defendant has been in custody because
of inability to make bail. In his discretion, he should sentence
in gross amount for the crime for which the defendant has been
convicted. Then, he should make a separate finding that the
defendant has been obliged to remain in custody because of
indigency; and upon such a finding, that time shall be deemed
as served in partial satisfaction of the sentence and the confining authority will so credit it.'
This decision has had substantial impact upon parole eligibility in Wisconsin. The Division of Corrections has interpreted
Klimas to mean that inmates sentenced to consecutive terms
(on multiple charges) will be credited with double time for
pretrial and presentence confinement. Thus, some indigent
convicts, sentenced for consecutive terms totalling up to
twenty-five years, have been considered eligible for a parole
hearing even before they arrive at the reformatory.'36 Because
the parole eligibility law'37 was not written with Klimas in
mind, revision by the legislature is necessary to resolve this
problem, or else expensive, inappropriate, and premature parole hearings will continue.
3
In two cases, Bruneau v. State'36 and State v. Hungerford,' 9
the court indicated to the legislature certain difficulties with
the statutes regarding concurrent and consecutive sentences
which the trial courts can impose. In Bruneauthe court again'
indicated the anomaly of Wisconsin Statutes section
973.15(1). 1" As previously construed, the statute prohibits the
imposition of consecutive sentences except where the defendant has commenced serving another sentence that has been
135. 75 Wis. 2d at 252, 249 N.W.2d at 289.
136. See The Milwaukee Journal, Sept. 18, 1977, at 1.
137. Wis. STAT. § 57.06 (1975).
138. 77 Wis. 2d 166, 252 N.W.2d 347 (1977).
139. 76 Wis. 2d 171, 251 N.W.2d 9 (1977).
140. Cf. Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977); Drinkwater v.
State, 69 Wis. 2d 60, 230 N.W.2d 126 (1975); Guyton v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 663, 230
N.W.2d 726 (1975). See text accompanying notes 126-32 supra, for a discussion of
Klimas.
141. See note 132, supra.
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previously imposed."'
Barbara Bruneau pleaded guilty to burglary and arson; the
court sentenced her to a seven-year indeterminate sentence for
burglary and a ten-year indeterminate sentence for arson. The
sentences were to be served consecutively and both were to be
consecutive to a manslaughter sentence that had been imposed
three days earlier in another court. The defendant argued that
it was beyond the sentencing authority of the court to order the
terms for burglary and arson to be served consecutively to the
term for manslaughter, because she had not yet commenced
serving the sentence for manslaughter. The supreme court
agreed, stating that the record demionstrated that Bruneau had
not been transported to Taycheedah for service of her sentence,
but had in fact been sitting in the county jail. Since she had
not yet begun the manslaughter sentence, only a concurrent
sentence could be imposed for the subsequent crimes."'
The state argued that acceptance of the defendant's position would cause serious equal protection problems in the future. The effect of the statute attaches controlling significance
to the speed with which defendants are transported to prison;
thus, consecutive or concurrent sentencing may be imposed by
chance and defendants receiving originally identical sentences
might eventually serve unequal amounts of time. The court
appreciated the argument because it demonstrated the need for
prompt and corrective legislative action. However, because the
state did not have standing to represent other convicted prisoners, the court itself could not adopt the state's position."'
The state also argued, based on Klimas v. State,'45 that if
the defendant received credit for presentance jail time, she
would effectively be serving the first sentence. The court responded by pointing out that because Bruneau was not
indigent the Klimas doctrine would not apply. Furthermore,
the court stated that a prisoner is not "serving a sentence"
under the terms of section 973.15(1) during the pretrial and
presentence periods for which Klimas mandates credit.
142. Drinkwater v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 60, 230 N.W.2d 126 (1975); Guyton v. State,
69 Wis. 2d 663, 230 N.W.2d 726 (1975).
143. 77 Wis. 2d at 168, 252 N.W.2d at 348.
144. Id. at 173, 252 N.W.2d at 350-51.
145. 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977). See text accompanying notes 126-32,
supra.
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TERM OF THE COURT

The court salvaged part of the sentence imposed for burglary and arson, by holding that the trial judge had authority
to make the burglary and arson sentences consecutive.'
Therefore, the remainder of time imposed by those sentences
(beyond the length of the previous sentence) effectively extended the time which the defendant would have to serve.
Throughout its discussion, as in previous cases, the court
requested that the legislature address the inherent problems of
section 973.15(1).
The court faced another problem with consecutive sentencing in State v. Hungerford.4 7 The defendant had been convicted of indecent behavior with a child and was committed to
Central State Hospital. He escaped from Central State but was
apprehended. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to escape and
was sentenced for an indeterminate term of not more than one
year; "but such sentence is to run although consecutive, it will
begin as of today, because there is no determined ending of any
sentence that may have been proposed or imposed."'' The
ambiguity of the sentencing language caused a dispute as to
whether the sentence was to be consecutive or had already been
served. As a result the trial court modified the sentence to
provide for one week's probation consecutive to the defendant's
commitment, because it considered the previous "sentence"
completed.
In challenging this modification, the state argued that Wisconsin Statutes section 946.42(4)149 required that the sentence
for escape be served consecutively to the sex crime commitment. The court first analyzed the nature of commitment
under chapter 975, the Sex Crimes Law."10 The court held that
146. 77 Wis. 2d at 170, 252 N.W.2d at 349-50.
147. 76 Wis. 2d 171, 251 N.W.2d 9 (1977).
148. Id. at 174, 251 N.W.2d at 10.
149. Wis. STAT. § 946.42(4) (1975) provides: "Sentences imposed under this section
shall be consecutive to any sentence previously imposed or which may be imposed for
any crime or offense for which the person was in custody when he escaped."
150. Wis. STAT. § 975.06 (1975) provides in part:
Commitment to the department. (1)(a) If the department recommends specialized treatment for the defendant's mental or physical aberrations, the court
shall order a hearing on the issue of the need for specialized treatment unless
such hearing is expressly waived by the defendant. ...
(2) If, upon completion of the hearing as required in sub. (1), it is found that
the defendant is in need of specialized treatment the court shall commit the
defendant to the department. The court may stay execution of the commitment
and place the defendant on probation under ch. 973 with a condition of probation that the defendant receive treatment in a manner to be prescribed by the
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commitment pursuant to the Law was neither civil commitment nor punishment for an offense.'-" Instead, commitment
under chapter 975 is an alternative to sentencing"2 and is an
independent proceeding different from penal sentencing.' 3 The
court recognized that although section 946.42(4) requires that
later sentences be consecutive to those which have been previously imposed, commitment under chapter 975 is not a sentence. Therefore, consecutive sentencing in this type of case,
while permissible, is not required by the statute. The court
admitted that the legislature might have intended the consecutive sentencing rule to apply to persons who escape from custody while committed. However, it should be noted that the
statute lacks language which would express this possible intent, and the court is bound to decide this issue in a manner
consistent with previous holdings. In addition, the court held
that since the defendant had already served the year's sentence
before the modification occurred, whether the modification was
in error or not involved moot issues."5 4
Problems inherent in the consecutive sentencing statutes
must be resolved for the benefit of defendants, their counsel,
prosecutors and the courts. Legislative intent is best provided
by clear statutory language, not by judicial construction.
Hopefully, the legislature will soon accept the court's frequent
requests for assistance in this area, and resolve the problems
of consecutive sentencing law.
THOMAS E. DUGAN
STEPHEN PAUL FORREST

INSURANCE
During the recent term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
again called upon to decide a wide variety of insurance cases.
court. If the defendant is not placed on probation, the court shall order the
defendant conveyed by the proper county authorities, at county expense, to the
sex crimes law facility designated by the department.
151. 76 Wis. 2d at 176, 251 N.W.2d at 11, citing, State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59
Wis. 2d 148, 167, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973).
152. 76 Wis. 2d at 177, 251 N.W.2d at 11, citing, State v. Neutz, 69 Wis. 2d 292,
295, 230 N.W.2d 806 (1975).
153. 76 Wis. 2d at 176, 251 N.W.2d at 11, citing, Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505,
526, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967).
154. 76 Wis. 2d at 178, 251 N.W.2d at 12.

